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Keeping the Zombies at Bay: Fourth
Amendment Problems in the Fight
Against Botnets
Danielle Potter*
Abstract
You may not have heard of a botnet. If you have, you may have
linked it to election shenanigans and nothing else. But if you are
reading this on a computer or smartphone, there is a good chance you
are in contact with a botnet right now.
Botnets, sometimes called “Zombie Armies,” are networks of
devices linked by a computer virus and controlled by cybercriminals.
Botnets operate on everyday devices owned by millions of Americans,
and thus pose a substantial threat to individual device owners as
well as the nation’s institutions and economy.
Accordingly, the United States government has been fighting
back vigorously against botnets. As botnets advance in
sophistication, the government’s methods for taking them down have
become more intrusive. In executing a botnet takedown, the
government collects IP addresses of the computers interfacing with
the botnet. Because botnets are camouflaged in personal computers
and devices, the government is unable to know which devices are
infected until the takedown is effectuated.
But what about the Fourth Amendment rights of innocent
owners, whose devices are enabling the botnet without their consent
or knowledge? Takedowns are beneficial to the owners because they
*
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liberate devices, but should we acquiesce to a government
cyber-invasion simply because of this benefit? This Note argues no.
Although the Fourth Amendment is implicated in botnet
takedowns, this should not mean the government cannot perform the
search; it simply means that the government needs to get a warrant
authorizing the search first. This Note argues that the 2016
amendment to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which allows multi-district warrants to be issued by one judge, is a
positive development for the Fourth Amendment and for the fight
against cybercriminals. But Rule 41 must be implemented in a way
that protects Fourth Amendment rights. To address this concern, this
Note argues that judges should be trained regarding cybercrime,
botnets, and the government’s takedown efforts so that judges can do
their jobs: Make sure the warrants are reasonable and protect the
Fourth Amendment rights of innocent victims.
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I. Introduction
During the 2016 presidential campaign, Russian hackers
commanded legions of social media bots that posed as individual
American social media users.1 These bots were used to spread fake
news, promulgate conspiracy theories, post unflattering
photographs of the opposing candidates, or “simply muddy
discussions.”2 For example, one Russian bot, disguised as “Melvin
Redick of Harrisburg, [Pennsylvania], a friendly-looking American
with a backward baseball cap and a young daughter,” encouraged
Facebook users to visit a website in order to learn the “hidden truth
about Hillary Clinton, George Soros, and other leaders of the US.”3
The website, DCLeaks.com, was in fact a Russian-created site
peddling stolen emails and conspiracy theories.4 Facebook reported
that it closed hundreds of accounts believed to have been created
by a Russian company.5 According to Twitter officials, during the

1. See Gabe O’Connor, How Russian Twitter Bots Pumped Out Fake News
During the 2016 Election, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 3, 2017, 4:53 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/04/03/522503844/howrussian-twitter-bots-pumped-out-fake-news-during-the-2016-election
(last
visited Oct. 10, 2020) (explaining that Russian Twitter bots were disguised as
“Midwestern swing-voter Republicans” in order to enhance the credibility of the
information proffered by the bots) [perma.cc/JHB8-CXDC].
2. See John Markoff, Automated Pro-Trump Bots Overwhelmed Pro-Clinton
Messages,
Researchers
Say,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
17,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/technology/automated-pro-trump-botsoverwhelmed-pro-clinton-messages-researchers-say.html (last visited Sept. 27,
2020) (explaining the purposes of the “automated army of pro-Donald J. Trump
chatbots”) [perma.cc/7TPQ-55LV].
3. Scott Shane, The Fake Americans Russia Created to Influence the
Election,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
7,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitterelection.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [perma.cc/W577-LWWC].
4. See Hamza Shaban, Twitter Suspends Guccifer and DCLeaks After
Mueller Links them to Russian Hacking Operation, WASH. POST (July 16, 2018,
3:35
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/07/16/twittersuspends-guccifer-dcleaks-after-mueller-links-them-russian-hacking-operation/
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (noting that DCLeaks was a “digital front” created by
Russian intelligence officers “to launder hacked information”) [perma.cc/YH4RPGAZ].
5. See Shane, supra note 3 (“Facebook officials disclosed that they . . . shut
down several hundred accounts that they believe were created by a Russian
company . . . .”).
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election, Russia created more than 50,000 fake Twitter accounts to
push its political agenda.6
The 2016 election thrust botnets into the spotlight, causing
newfound concern among politicians and private individuals.7 But
long before the 2016 election, botnets had been engaging in online
mischief.8
A bot is an internet-connected device that has been
compromised by a computer hacker’s virus.9 A botnet is an army of
bots all infected with the same virus.10 Botnets have been
nicknamed “zombie armies” because, through the virus, the hacker
can command the bots to act at her behest, without their owners’
knowledge.11 The term zombie army is also appropriate for another
reason: These things are extremely hard to kill.12
The United States government had its first major victory in
the fight against botnets in 2011.13 Its target, Coreflood, was a
6. See Jon Swaine, Twitter Admits Far More Russian Bots Posted on
Election than It Had Disclosed, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2018, 7:46 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/19/twitter-admits-far-morerussian-bots-posted-on-election-than-it-had-disclosed (last visited Oct. 10, 2020)
(“Twitter has admitted that more than 50,000 Russia-linked accounts used its
service to post automated material about the 2016 US election . . . .”)
[perma.cc/SQ2D-X897].
7. See What Is a Botnet?, PANDA SEC. (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/security/what-is-a-botnet/
(last
visited Oct. 10, 2020) (“Facebook’s fake ad controversy and the Twitter bot fiasco
during the 2016 presidential election worry many politicians and citizens about
the disruptive potential of botnets.”) [perma.cc/M99A-2QYL].
8. See 9 of History’s Notable Botnets, WHITE OPS (May 2018),
https://www.whiteops.com/blog/9-of-the-most-notable-botnets (last visited Oct.
16, 2020) (describing several notable botnet attacks, and naming the first notable
attack as EarthLink Spammer, a botnet that was created in 2000)
[perma.cc/FJ5B-P83L].
9. See
What
Are
Bots,
Botnets,
and
Zombies?,
WEBROOT,
https://www.webroot.com/us/en/resources/tips-articles/what-are-bots-botnetsand-zombies (last visited Oct. 9, 2020) (defining the term “bot”) [perma.cc/6RYL7EST].
10. See id. (explaining what a botnet is).
11. See id. (explaining how botnets work).
12. See Lysa Myers, Top 5 Scariest Zombie Botnets, WELIVESECURITY (Oct.
23, 2014, 3:45 PM), https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/10/23/top-5-scariestzombie-botnets/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (“A network of zombies is a bit like
post-apocalyptic infection scenarios in the movies. Some of these things are
virtually un-killable—there always seems to be that last undead creature lurking
in the shadows, ready to start the next wave of trouble.”) [perma.cc/H6NE-7CXE].
13. See David Sancho, A Win for the Good Guys: The Coreflood Takedown,
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criminal botnet that had been lurking on the internet since the
early aughts.14 By 2011, it had infiltrated about 800,000 devices in
the United States.15 Globally, the number of infected machines was
close to 2.3 million.16 Coreflood operated by logging keystrokes in
order to steal users’ passwords and financial information.17 The
botnet was so successful in its criminal pursuits that Coreflood’s
operators had access to more accounts than they could possibly
exploit, forcing them to comb through the collected data to find
accounts worth stealing from.18 In total, Coreflood caused at least
twenty million dollars of damages.19
In April 2011, the U.S. District Court in Connecticut issued an
order allowing the government to commandeer twenty-nine
domain names that had been used to facilitate Coreflood’s criminal

SEC. INTEL. BLOG (Apr. 14, 2011, 5:46 AM), https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabssecurity-intelligence/a-win-for-the-good-guys-the-coreflood-takedown/
(last
visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing the Coreflood takedown as “a great victory for
law enforcement and for all the good guys fighting against cybercrime”)
[perma.cc/ECS2-BTJ6].
14. See Matt Liebowitz, Feds Shut Down Massive ‘Coreflood’ Botnet, NBC
NEWS,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42596694/ns/technology_and_sciencesecurity/t/feds-shut-down-massive-coreflood-botnet/#.Xhd-X5NKjfY (last updated
Apr. 14, 2011, 4:45 PM) (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (stating that, in 2011, the
Coreflood botnet was “believed to have been active for nearly a decade”)
[perma.cc/J79P-NHGW].
15. See Dan Goodin, Feds Declare Victory over Notorious Coreflood Botnet,
REGISTER
(June
23,
2011,
9:09
PM),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/06/23/coreflood_botnet_eradicated/
(last
visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing the 2011 Coreflood takedown and stating that
Coreflood “enslaved almost 800,000 machines when the FBI commenced the
operation in April”) [perma.cc/KB69-TUYZ].
16. See Dan Kaplan, Coreflood Takedown May Lead to Trouble, ITNEWS (Apr.
18, 2011, 10:34 AM), https://www.itnews.com.au/news/coreflood-takedown-maylead-to-trouble-254827 (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (providing an estimate of the
total size of the Coreflood botnet) [perma.cc/CD79-VK5U].
17. See id. (describing the Coreflood botnet); Janine S. Hiller, Civil
Cyberconflict: Microsoft, Cybercrime, and Botnets, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH
L.J. 163, 172–73 (2014) (describing the damage caused by the Coreflood botnet).
18. See Sam Zeitlin, Note, Botnet Takedowns and the Fourth Amendment, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 746, 747 (2015) (“The Russian cybercriminals who created
Coreflood trawled through their ever-growing trove of financial data looking for
bank balances big enough to be worth taking—they had access to far more
accounts than they could ever exploit.”).
19. See Hiller, supra note 17, at 173 (“Estimates of Coreflood damages
exceeded $20 million.”).
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activity.20 The order further allowed the government to substitute
the seized servers with government-controlled servers.21 When an
infected computer contacted the substitute servers, the servers
responded with commands instructing the infected computers to
temporarily stop running Coreflood software.22 The order also
allowed the government to use a trap-and-trace device to learn the
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of infected machines.23
While Coreflood’s malicious software was temporarily
disabled, the government released the victims’ IP addresses to
their internet service providers (ISPs) so that the providers could
alert the victims that their machines were infected and advise
them how to remove the malware.24 Within two months of the court
order, “computers reporting to the botnet’s command and control
center fell by more than 95 percent.”25
The takedown was a huge success for the government, but for
private individuals it was a double-edged sword.26 On one hand,
the government had liberated thousands of victims’ devices.27 On

20. See United States v. John Doe 1, No. 3:11-CV-00561-VLB, at *5 (D. Conn.
2011) (granting a preliminary injunction).
21. See id. (granting a preliminary injunction).
22. See id. (granting a preliminary injunction).
23. See Kim Zetter, With Court Order, FBI Hijacks “Coreflood” Botnet, Sends
Kill Signal, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/2011/04/coreflood/ (last updated Apr.
13, 2011, 7:30 PM) (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing the Coreflood takedown)
[perma.cc/YG3F-SLR8].
24. See id. (describing the Coreflood takedown).
25. Goodin, supra note 15.
26. See Jeff Mordock, “Inherently Invasive”:
FBI Counter-Hacking
Operations Raise Red Flags over Privacy, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jan/31/fbi-counter-hackingoperations-raise-privacy-red-f/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (noting that law
enforcement’s success in defeating botnets by hacking back “is a double-edged
sword, giving authorities a new tool to fight crime in an increasingly digital world,
but also exposing sensitive and unrelated files to law enforcement”)
[perma.cc/65VP-3DW2].
27. See Goodin, supra note 15 (explaining that the government takedown rid
thousands of machines of Coreflood malware).
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the other hand, the government had invaded those very same
victims’ devices.28 And it had done so without a warrant.29
According to the judge who issued the court order, no warrant
was necessary.30 That determination was crucial because, at the
time of the Coreflood takedown, under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, no magistrate would have had the authority
to grant a warrant for extra-district botnet takedowns.31
Since the Coreflood takedown, cybercriminals have upped the
ante, creating more resilient botnets.32 In turn, the government
has developed more aggressive—and inherently more intrusive—
takedown methods.33 As botnets continue to evolve, so must the
government’s efforts to combat them.34 It is a high stakes games of
cops and robbers with a twist—both the cops and the robbers are
invisible.
Speaking of an “invisible policeman,” when does the
government cross the line and enter Fourth Amendment
territory?35 Between 2011 and 2016, the government performed
28. See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to
Ron
Wyden,
Senator,
U.S.
Senate
(Nov.
18,
2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3225184/DOJ-Rule-41Response.pdf (admitting that “some courts might hold” that the techniques used
to collect victims’ IP addresses and disrupt a botnet implicate the Fourth
Amendment) [perma.cc/QDE6-NY9J].
29. See United States v. John Doe 1, No. 3:11-CV-00561-VLB, at *5 (D. Conn.
2011) (granting the government’s request for civil relief).
30. See id. (granting the government’s request for civil relief).
31. See Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Just., to the Hon. Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Crim. Rules (Sept.
18, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Ramanletter-to-committee-.pdf (explaining Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure needs to be amended to permit warrants for botnet takedowns)
[perma.cc/C54B-6UCN].
32. See Julian B. Gizzard et al., Peer-to-Peer Botnets: Overview and Case
Study,
USENIX,
Jan.
2007,
at
1,
https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/hotbots07/tech/full_papers/grizzard/grizzar
d.pdf (explaining that, in response to successful takedowns, attackers began
creating sturdier botnet structures) [perma.cc/CHJ5-ER7P].
33. See id. (describing the additional steps necessary to take down a stronger
botnet).
34. See id. (explaining that, as botnets grow stronger, takedown methods will
need to improve).
35. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(noting that a statute authorizing electronic surveillance “in effect, places an
invisible policeman in the home”).
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several major botnet takedowns.36 Some of these operations were
even more invasive than the Coreflood takedown, actually
manipulating data on victims’ devices.37 Still, in each case, the
government was able to convince a judge that there were no Fourth
Amendment issues.38
In 2016, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
was amended to allow magistrate judges to grant extra-district
warrants in cases involving botnets.39 Privacy enthusiasts
lampooned the change,40 but this Note argues that the amendment
is a step in the right direction.
Before Rule 41 was passed, the government conducted botnet
takedowns under civil rather than criminal law—obtaining court
orders instead of warrants.41 This Note argues that even those
early takedowns indeed implicated the Fourth Amendment. But
the author is sympathetic to the government’s dilemma—it had to
operate outside of the Fourth Amendment because the Federal
Rules had not caught up with the times.
This Note argues that, without the amendment to Rule 41, the
government would be forced to continue to convince courts that
36. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temp. Restraining
Ord. and Ord. to Show Cause, at 3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2016) (listing several
successful botnet takedowns since Coreflood).
37. See Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchieri, How the FBI Took Down the Botnet
Designed to Be “Impossible” to Takedown, VICE (Aug. 12, 2015, 7:00 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/539xy5/how-the-fbi-took-down-the-botnetdesigned-to-be-impossible-to-take-down (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (explaining
that, to take down the GameOver Zeus botnet, the government needed to
persuade bots to talk only to government servers and refrain from talking to
servers run by the cybercriminals) [perma.cc/Y646-9JTU]; see also Julian B.
Gizzard, et al., supra note 32 (describing methods used to take down peer-to-peer
botnets).
38. See United States v. Ghinkul, No. 2:2015-CV-1315, 2020 WL 85256, at
*1, *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2020) (granting civil relief); United States v. Bogachev,
No. 2:14-CV-00685, at *4–8 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (same).
39. See Leslie R. Caldwell, Rule 41 Changes Ensure a Judge May Consider
Warrants for Certain Remote Searches, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ARCHIVES (June 20,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/rule-41-changes-ensure-judgemay-consider-warrants-certain-remote-searches (last visited Oct. 10, 2020)
(explaining the purpose of the 2016 amendment to Rule 41) [perma.cc/986V4YR2].
40. See, e.g., Mordock, supra note 26 (discussing criticism of the Rule 41
amendments).
41. See Ghinkul, 2020 WL 85256, at *2 (granting civil relief); Bogachev, No.
2:14-CV-00685, at *4–8 (same).
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takedown methods do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. These
decisions could lead to dangerous precedents. One possibility is
that botnet takedowns will become an established form of exigent
circumstances.42 An exception to the warrant requirement, exigent
circumstances have historically been applied to situations so
urgent that there is no time to get a warrant.43 Although this Note
does not explore the application of exigent circumstances to botnet
takedowns, the author suggests that such an expansion of the
doctrine is untenable.44
Instead, this Note will focus on dangerous precedents within
the confines of the warrant requirement. To demonstrate the
possibility for the perversion of search law as it relates to
technology, this Note will focus on the government’s retrieval of IP
addresses. This Note will argue that such retrieval is a search,
despite some court decisions that hold otherwise.45
The purpose of this Note is not to campaign against the
collection of IP addresses. In fact, in the author’s view, this
collection is one of the least intrusive steps that the government
takes when fighting botnets. Instead, the purpose is to show that,
because even the most innocuous step of a botnet takedown is a
search, botnet takedowns inherently implicate the Fourth
Amendment.
One day, the government will have to develop means to
overcome even more fanciful botnet disguises: Malware that can
embed in the smoke detector, the garage door opener, or the dog’s
implanted identity chip.46 Of course, these attacks require a
response. But that response must comply with civil liberties,
including the Fourth Amendment. Rule 41 allows courts to apply
the Fourth Amendment in the battle against botnets. When the
42. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 758–59 n.72 (noting the possibility that
exigent circumstances could cover botnet takedowns).
43. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 473–77 (2011) (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the notion that exigent circumstances require urgency).
44. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 758–59 n.72 (outlining the dangers of
applying the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in the
context of botnet takedowns).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir.
2010) (holding that the government’s retrieval of an IP address is not a search).
46. See MARC GOODMAN, FUTURE CRIMES 287 (Anchor Books 2015)
(explaining that, in the future, virtually everything will be connected to the
internet and capable of sharing data).
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government mass hacks—even for a good cause—it should be
regulated by the Fourth Amendment.47
II. A Brief Explanation of Botnets
A botnet is a network of devices linked by a virus and
controlled remotely by a computer hacker, known as a botmaster.48
To create a botnet, a botmaster “writes a computer program that
searches the internet for connected devices.”49 The program
attempts to infiltrate the devices that it finds, and, if it is
successful, it will install the botnet virus onto the devices.50
Botnets can attack any device connected to the internet.51
Many commonly used smart devices are vulnerable because they
47. See Jonathan Meyer, Government Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. 570, 614 (2018)
(“Courts should end their myopic focus on which data government malware
retrieves and acknowledge that government hacking necessarily constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search.”).
48. See Nicole Hong, Brooklyn Trial to Reveal the Inner Workings of ‘Botnet’
Hackers,
WALL
ST.
J.
(July
22,
2017,
7:00
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/brooklyn-trial-to-reveal-inner-workings-of-botnethackers-1500721201 (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing botnets as “a network
of computers with malicious software”) [perma.cc/H2ES-VZ5F]; see also Hiller,
supra note 17, at 167 (“An essential aspect of a botnet is that another party, at a
distance, controls the network of infected computers.”).
49. Stephen Ornes, Rise of the Botnets, SCI. NEWS FOR STUDENTS (Feb. 21,
2019,
6:45
AM),
https://www.sciencenewsforstudents.org/article/botnetsmalware-cyberattack-increase (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [perma.cc/886U-6Y6C].
50. See id. (explaining that, once the computer program has broken into a
device, “the program can install malware”).
51. See Botnet Facts, WASH. STATE OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN.,
https://www.atg.wa.gov/botnet-facts (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (“All computers
connected to the Internet are susceptible to malware infections.”)
[perma.cc/K5HD-982S]; see also How the FBI Investigated and Dismantled the
Mirai
Botnet,
BIZTECH
(June
19,
2019),
https://biztechmagazine.com/media/video/how-fbi-investigated-and-dismantledmirai-botnet (explaining that “the Marai botnet attack turned Internet of Things
devices . . . into [a] bot[] that could be used as part of a botnet in large-scale
network attacks”) [perma.cc/RXJ9-3PL9]; see, e.g., Shaquille De Bique, The
Botnet Threat Against Smart Refrigerator Security, 1, 3 (May, 2019) (Ph.D.
dissertation, Utica College) (ProQuest) (explaining that smart refrigerators “are
very susceptible to botnet attacks”); The Odd, 8-Year Legacy of the Conficker
Worm,
WELIVESECURITY
(Nov.
21,
2016,
1:30
PM),
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/11/21/odd-8-year-legacy-conficker-worm/
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing the Conficker botnet which infiltrated “MRI
machines, CT scanners and dialysis pumps” and police body cameras)
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come with a default password that the user never bothers to
change.52 Cybercriminals can easily guess these passwords in
order to hack into the device.53 For example, in 2016, “a massive
botnet composed of baby monitors, webcams, and other common
devices” wreaked havoc on the internet.54
Computers with secure systems can also fall victim to a
botnet.55 Using email attachments and pop up ads containing
malicious website links,56 botnets “trick . . . users into
compromising their own security.”57 Even when a device owner
takes all of the possible precautions, botmasters can still find a way
in.58 Botnets often infiltrate devices through known security
vulnerabilities in commercially available security systems.59 For
[perma.cc/87Z6-ZHGX].
52. See Ornes, supra note 49 (“New devices like smart TVs, wi-fi routers and
security cameras are sold with a default password in place. (It’s often something
easy, like ‘password.’) According to a survey conducted by a computer magazine
in June and July 2018, more than one-third of people never change their
passwords.”).
53. See id. (explaining that, because of default passwords, it is “easier than
you might think” for a cybercriminal to guess a device’s password); see also Shane
Harris, Presidential Commission Sounds Warning over Botnet Threat, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 3, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/presidential-commissionsounds-warning-over-botnet-threat-1480764656 (last visited Oct. 10, 2020)
(noting that the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity recommended
that a device should not be able to connect to the internet until its default
password had been reset because default passwords “are often easy for hackers to
guess”) [perma.cc/TD8L-38L6].
54. See Harris, supra note 53 (describing an attack that resulted in
“widespread outages and congestion”).
55. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 749 (explaining that botnets “grow by
finding vulnerable computers and infecting them with malware,” but even
“computers protected by firewalls and more up-to-date software” are susceptible
to infection through “social engineering”) (citations omitted).
56. See Botnet Facts, supra note 51 (“If you open an email attachment or visit
a website that is distributing malware, your computer may become
infected . . . .”); see also What is a Botnet, supra note 7 (“The strategy typically
requires users to infect their own systems by opening email attachments, clicking
on malicious pop up ads, or downloading dangerous software from a website.”).
57. Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 749.
58. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Takes Action
to
Disable
International
Botnet
(Apr.
13,
2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-takes-action-disableinternational-botnet (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (explaining how Coreflood
thrived) [perma.cc/7CW5-MJ9A].
59. See Hiller, supra note 17, at 170 (“Ironically, releases of vulnerability
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example, Coreflood targeted Microsoft computers in order to take
advantage of a flaw in the Windows operating systems.60
Botnets are particularly nefarious criminal devices because
they are difficult to eradicate.61 The infection is discrete, so owners
of the infected computers are generally not even aware of the
virus’s presence.62 Even if a user is aware of the botnet’s presence,
only a highly skilled computer user would be to able remove the
botnet without technical assistance.63 Finally, it is difficult for law
enforcement to identify the botnet operator.64 And, even when the
operator is identified, she may be from another country and out of
law enforcement’s reach.65
information and patches are known to sometimes create the opposite result;
malware can be propagated seeking to exploit the weakness before computers are
updated.”).
60. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 58 (explaining that
Coreflood “install[ed] itself by exploiting a vulnerability in computers running
Windows operating systems”).
61. See Bill Brenner, Botnets: 4 Reasons It’s Getting Harder to Find and
Fight
Them,
CSO
(Apr.
15,
2009,
7:00
AM),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2123967/botnets--4-reasons-it-s-gettingharder-to-find-and-fight-them.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (explaining why it
is very difficult to defeat botnets) [perma.cc/95ZV-2K3P].
62. See Botnet Facts, supra note 51 (explaining that “[i]n the past, sluggish
performance and annoying advertisements” alerted users that their computers
were compromised, but “[t]hese days, there may be no outward signs you have
malware”); see also Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Used New Weapons to Disrupt Major
Websites
Across
U.S.,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Oct.
21,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/business/internet-problems-attack.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing a botnet that infected “internet-connected
devices . . . without their owners’ knowledge”) [perma.cc/P2LT-QZUY]; see also
Mark Bowden, The Worm that Nearly Ate the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/opinion/sunday/conficker-wormukraine.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (defining botnets as “networks of secretly
linked personal computers controlled by an unseen hand”) [perma.cc/T3E9LATF].
63. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 750 (“Most botnets are difficult for all but
the most sophisticated users to remove from their computers.”) (citations
omitted).
64. See Daniel Ramsbrock et al., A First Step Toward Live Botmaster
Traceback, Presentation at International Symposium on Research in Attacks,
Intrusions, and Defenses (Sept. 16, 2008), at 2 (explaining the various reasons
why “[t]racking and locating the botmaster of a discovered botnet is very
challenging”).
65. See
What
Is
a
DDOS
Botnet?,
CLOUDFLARE,
https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/what-is-a-ddos-botnet/ (last visited
Oct. 24, 2019) (explaining that botnet operation is a particularly successful
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Botnet operators use botnets for a variety of cybercrimes, both
against the infected devices’ users and third parties.66 Botnets are
not always committed to just one criminal objective, and
sometimes a botnet’s primary goal will evolve over time.67 Often,
botnets are used for financial gain.68 Cybercriminals can use
botnets to steal data, which they can then use to steal the computer
user’s identity or financial information.69 Alternatively,
cybercriminals can install devices with ransomware, “which
encrypts and hijacks files on a computer system and later demands
money for decrypting them.”70
Botnets have also frequently been used to launch denial of
service attacks.71 These attacks temporarily disable websites by
flooding them with more traffic than they can handle.72
Sometimes, the botnet controller will demand money from the
endeavor in “geographic locations where regulation and law enforcement are
limited”) [perma.cc/ZS2K-NTTF].
66. See Hong, supra note 48 (“[B]otnets . . . allow hackers to remotely control
the computers and command them for criminal purposes, including to steal
banking credentials, launch denial-of-service attacks and transmit viruses.”); see
also Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 750 (“Botnets are the Swiss army knife of
cybercrime, a ubiquitous tool used for many different purposes against both the
users of infected computers and third parties.”).
67. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 750–51 (discussing the Coreflood botnet and
explaining that when it “was first created sometime around 2002, its primary
purpose was to be a tool for distributed denial of service . . . attacks,” but “[b]y
2008, Coreflood’s focus had moved to bank fraud, using credentials stolen from
infected computers to empty their owners’ bank accounts”) (citations omitted).
68. See What is a Botnet?, supra note 7 (outlining the different goals of the
cybercriminals who command botnets and providing that one of those goals is
financial gain).
69. See Botnet Facts, supra note 51 (explaining that botnets can be used to
steal personal information for identify theft and credit card fraud).
70. Hong, supra note 48; see, e.g., Patricia Mazzei, Another Hacked Florida
City Pays a Ransom, This Time for $460,000, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/lake-city-florida-ransomcyberattack.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (reporting on a city government’s
payout to cybercriminals who “launched a cyberattack that disabled the city’s
computer systems”) [perma.cc/U6PW-X2B6].
71. See What is A Botnet?, supra note 7 (providing that botnet operators use
botnets in denial of service attacks and explaining how these attacks are carried
out).
72. See Perlroth, supra note 62 (describing a botnet attack that disabled
“several websites, including Twitter, Netflix, Spotify, Airbnb, Reddit, Etsy,
SoundCloud and The New York Times” by “command[ing] [infected computers] to
flood a target with overwhelming traffic”).
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targeted organization in exchange for ceasing the attack.73 Even if
no ransom is demanded, a denial of service attack can take a
financial toll on a company whose website is attacked because,
while the website is under attack, customers cannot use the
company’s services.74 Denial of service attacks often target
companies,75 but they can also target national infrastructures.76 A
denial of service attack “on critical national infrastructure could
cause widespread disruption including large populations suffering
major power outages, significant business or market disturbance,
life threatening emergency service outages and long term economic
damage.”77
Furthermore, botnets can “be used by governments for
espionage, infecting and controlling sensitive systems, and
extracting confidential data.”78 For example, in 2019, a botnet
73. See Mathew J. Schwartz, Cyber Extortion: Fighting DDoS Attacks, BANK
INFO SEC. (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/cyber-extortionfighting-ddos-attacks-a-8828 (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (“Attackers disrupt a site
for a short period with a distributed denial-of-service attack, send a ransom note
threatening further disruption, and if the ransom doesn’t get paid, sometimes
make good on that threat.”) [perma.cc/C78L-VTMC].
74. See Ornes, supra note 49 (discussing an October 2016 botnet attack that
“crippled dozens of websites . . . includ[ing] Amazon, PayPal, Spotify and Twitter”
and explaining that “[a]ttacked businesses lost money when customers couldn’t
buy things”).
75. See Blair Felter, 5 of the Most Famous Recent DDoS Attacks, VXCHNGE
(May 31, 2019), https://www.vxchnge.com/blog/recent-ddos-attacks-on-companies
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (naming five famous denial of service attacks which
targeted companies such as GitHub, Netflix, PayPal, Visa, Amazon, The New
York Times, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and PNC)
[perma.cc/2ZBL-D43Y].
76. See, e.g., Bradley Barth, DDoS Attacks Delay Trains, Halt
Transportation Services in Sweden, SC MEDIA (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.scmagazineuk.com/ddos-attacks-delay-trains-halt-transportationservices-sweden/article/1473963 (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing a denial of
service attack aimed at the Swedish Transport Administration that “crashed the
IT system that monitors trains’ locations and tells operators when to go or stop”)
[perma.cc/BJ93-STLL].
77. Ashley Stephenson, Why Critical National Infrastructure Organizations
Shouldn’t Overlook DDoS Attacks, CORERO NETWORK SEC. (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://www.corero.com/blog/901-why-critical-national-infrastructureorganizations-shouldnt-overlook-ddos-attacks.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2020)
[perma.cc/9DUZ-P6ZN].
78. Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 751 (citing HELI TIIRMAA-KLAAR, ET. AL.,
BOTNETS, at 12–15 (Sandro Gaycken et al. eds., 2013)); see Tagging and Tracking
ON
SEC.
(July
30,
2012),
Espionage
Botnets,
KREBS
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unleashed malware that targeted United States utility
companies.79 The malware, nicknamed “LookBack,” infiltrated the
computers of employees working within the utilities industry
sector in order “to steal data files and take operational
screenshots.”80 Though the botnet’s origins were never confirmed,
APT10, a hacking group backed by China, “is the most likely
culprit.”81
Botnets can also be used to influence public opinion in favor of
the botnet operator’s agenda.82 Russia’s use of botnets to interfere
with the 2016 presidential election is one prominent example of
this use,83 but that was not the first time that botnets have been
used for propaganda.84 The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
used botnets to “achieve[] name recognition.”85 After carrying out
a terrorist attack, ISIS members used Twitter to claim
responsibility for the attack.86 Then, legions of ISIS-controlled fake

https://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/espionage-botnet/
(discussing
“malicious
software that was developed and deployed specifically for spying on governments,
activists and industry executives”) [perma.cc/5VK2-HKUE].
79. See Zak Doffman, Chinese State Hackers Suspected of Malicious Cyber
Attack
on
U.S.
Utilities,
FORBES (Aug.
3,
2019,
2:31
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/03/chinese-state-hackerssuspected-of-malicious-cyber-attack-on-u-s-utilities/#43aec8146758 (last visited
Oct. 10, 2020) (describing the “cyber campaign [that] target[ed] U.S. utility
companies”) [perma.cc/VH3U-WTB7].
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See What Is a Botnet, supra note 7 (referencing the use of botnets as “tools
for influencing elections”).
83. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of
Russian botnets in the 2016 presidential election).
84. See Moustafa Ayad, Twitter Has Been Flooded with ISIS Propaganda
Since
al
Baghdadi’s
Death,
VICE (Nov. 1, 2019, 1:09 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/9kevpp/twitter-has-been-flooded-with-isispropaganda-since-al-baghdadis-death (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (“While most of
the attention has been focused on Russian-backed botnet interference in the 2016
US elections and the 2016 Brexit vote, ISIS was one of the first terrorist groups
to pioneer swarming social media with posts from automated and semi-automated
accounts.”) [perma.cc/8Q3E-GMVZ].
85. Aaron Delwiche & Mary Margaret Herring, ISIS Botnet, PROPAGANDA
CRITIC (Aug. 8, 2018), https://propagandacritic.com/index.php/case-studies/isisbotnet/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [perma.cc/KW7X-AXE4].
86. See id. (discussing how ISIS “leveraged Twitter as a way of taking
responsibility for successful terrorist attacks”).
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Twitter accounts retweeted and favorited the messages.87 In this
way, ISIS “made it highly likely that mainstream media would see
their content and amplify it even as they condemned it.”88
III. Hacking Back
Because of the dangers posed by botnets, the government has
a significant interest in fighting back against them.89 Since the
Coreflood takedown, the government has consistently gathered
victims’ IP addresses in order to enlist the victims’ assistance in
taking down the botnet by liberating their own machines.90
This section will describe two takedowns that typify the
government’s approach, but there are other takedown methods
that would not require the government to gather IP addresses.91
These methods, however, require more egregious invasions of the
victims’ devices.92 For example, instead of contacting the victim in
order to get her to remove the malware, the government could
remotely instruct the malware to remove itself.93

87. See id. (citing Twitter Inc., Combatting Violent Extremism, TWITTER
BLOG (Feb. 5, 2016), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/a/2016/combatingviolent-extremism.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (explaining how ISIS used “an
army of bots to create false consensus online”)) [perma.cc/XT6W-RB22].
88. Id. (quoting Renee Diresta, How ISIS and Russia Won Friends and
Manufactured
Crowds,
WIRED
(Mar.
8,
2018,
7:00
AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/isis-russia-manufacture-crowds/ (last visited Oct.
16, 2020) [perma.cc/82VS-7R2V].
89. See Hong, supra note 48 (“Justice Department officials have urged
Congress in recent years to modernize the laws that fight cybercrime . . . .”); see
also Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee, 116th Cong. 5–6 (2019) (statement of
Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (discussing the
FBI’s efforts to combat security risks posed by botnets).
90. See, e.g., Zetter, supra note 23 (noting that the government collected IP
addresses in the Coreflood takedown).
91. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 752–54 (discussing methods for dismantling
botnets).
92. See id. at 754 (explaining that the most intrusive method for fighting
botnets “involves modifying not just the malware, but the user’s personal software
as well”).
93. See id. at 753 (noting that law enforcement could hack back in order “to
modify or delete the malware running on infected computers”).

KEEPING THE ZOMBIES AT BAY

375

A. Centralized Botnets: Coreflood
Traditional botnets are centered around one or a few central
servers, which are identified in the virus’s code.94 In its early
efforts to fight against botnets, the government generally
partnered with ISPs in order to remove these servers.95 By
shutting down a botnet’s domains, the government was able to
freeze out the operator for a while.96 But the devices comprising
the botnet remained infected,97 and to regain control, the botnet’s
operators need only rewrite the botnet’s virus to answer to a new
set of domain names.98
In 2011, instead of just shutting down Coreflood’s central
servers, the government created a “sinkhole.”99 Sinkholing
reroutes bot “traffic from its original destination to one specified
by the sinkhole [operator].”100 The revised destination is called a
94. See Gizzard, et al., supra note 32 (explaining the centralized structure of
traditional botnets); see also Zack Whittaker, The Sinkhole that Saved the
(July
8,
2019,
3:47
PM),
Internet,
TECHCRUNCH
https://techcrunch.com/2019/07/08/the-wannacry-sinkhole/ (last visited Oct. 16,
2020) (noting that a botnet was stopped by registering a “web domain found in
the malware’s code”) [perma.cc/B72Q-MPD9].
95. See Kaplan, supra note 16 (describing the difference between the
Coreflood takedown and prior botnet takedowns).
96. See id. (describing the difference between the Coreflood takedown and
prior botnet takedowns).
97. See United States v. John Doe, No. 3:11-CV-00561, at *3 (D. Conn. 2011)
(acknowledging that the seizure of Coreflood’s servers would “leave the infected
computers still running Coreflood”).
98. See Kaplan, supra note 16 (explaining that, using the pre-Coreflood
takedown method, botnets became temporarily defunct, but operators could
resurrect the botnet by creating “a new hub”); see also Lily Hay Newman, Hacker
Lexicon: What Is Sinkholing?, WIRED (Jan. 2, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/what-is-sinkholing/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2020)
(describing a sinkhole that “couldn’t block the malware from being rewritten” in
a way that would allow the malware to evade the sinkhole) [perma.cc/ZY892QDS].
99. See Lucian Constantin, FBI Remotely Uninstalled Coreflood Malware
from 19,000 Computers, SOFTPEDIA NEWS (June 22, 2011, 4:29 PM),
https://news.softpedia.com/news/FBI-Remotely-Uninstalled-Coreflood-Malwarefrom-19-000-Computers-207635.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (noting that, in
the Coreflood case, the judge “authorized the bureau to set up a sinkhole server”)
[perma.cc/J94W-YBXK].
100. Margaret Rouse & Matthew Haughn, Definition: Botnet Sinkhole,
TECHTARGET,
https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/botnet-sinkhole
(last
updated June 2014) (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [perma.cc/D3K7-V2MS].
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sinkhole.101 To prevent the infected machines from continuing to
run Coreflood’s malware, the government used the sinkhole to
respond to bots with commands to stop running the malware.102
Additionally, in order to facilitate the permanent liberation of the
infected computers, the government used the information gathered
from the sinkhole to collect the IP addresses of infected computers
in order to independently locate and notify victims.103
B. Peer-to-Peer Botnets: Kelihos
A traditional botnet’s centralized infrastructure makes it easy
and efficient for botnet operators to “push commands to, and
receive information from, infected bots.”104 But, as demonstrated
by the Coreflood takedown, the centrality of a traditional botnet is
also its Achilles heel.105
Cybercriminals have responded to this vulnerability by
creating peer-to-peer botnets.106 In a peer-to-peer botnet, infected
computers communicate with each other rather than checking in
with central servers.107 To facilitate this communication, bots
regularly exchange “peer lists,” updating each other when new bots
are added, and warning each other about suspicious bots.108 If a
101. See id. (“The altered destination is known as the sinkhole.”).
102. See Doe, No. 3:11-CV-00561 at *3 (allowing the government to use its
substitute servers to send stop commands to infected computers).
103. See Zetter, supra note 23 (describing the Coreflood takedown).
104. Declaration of Special Agent Elliot Peterson in Support of Application for
an Emergency Restraining Ord. and Ord. to Show Cause Re Preliminary
Injunction, United States v. Bogachev, No. 2:14-CV-00685 (W.D. Pa. 2014); see
Gizzard, et. al, supra note 32 (explaining that centralized structures “provide[]
the attackers with very efficient communication”).
105. See Gizzard, supra note 32, at 1 (“The threat of [a centralized] botnet can
be mitigated and possibly eliminated if the central [server] is incapacitated.”).
106. See id. at 1–3 (explaining that peer-to-peer architecture was developed
in response to centralized botnet takedowns).
107. See Michael Mimoso, Peer-to-Peer Botnets Resilient to Takedown
Attempts, THREAT POST (May 31, 2013, 2:15 PM), https://threatpost.com/peer-topeer-botnets-resilient-to-takedown-attempts/100851/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2020)
(“In Peer-to-Peer botnets, compromised bots talk to each other rather than to a
central server.”) [perma.cc/5EYP-LSY3].
108. Christian Rossow et al., Modeling and Evaluating the Resilience of Peerto-Peer Botnets, 2013 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY,
https://christian-rossow.de/publications/p2pwned-ieee2013.pdf (last visited Feb.
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particular bot is compromised, “the gaps in the network are closed
and the network continues to operate under the control of the
attacker.”109
To take down Kelihos, a peer-to-peer botnet, the FBI infected
its own machines with Kelihos malware and then manipulated
those newly infected machines into “supernodes.”110 The
supernodes acted as mini-sinkholes.111 When an infected machine
contacted a super node, the super node responded with the IP
address and routing information of an FBI controlled server.112
Again, the FBI server then recorded the IP addresses of infected
computers so that the FBI could release that information to the
victims’ ISPs.113 The ISPs then told victims about the infection and
helped them remove the malware.114
IV. The Privacy Implications of Hacking Back
Despite the dangers posed by botnets, the invasiveness of
takedown efforts raises privacy concerns.115 When private parties
use sinkholes, many of these concerns are addressed by the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).116 The CFAA is a federal
20, 2020) (“All [peer-to-peer] botnets implement the concept of peer lists to keep
track of neighboring peers.”) [perma.cc/7CJU-BRST].
109. Gizzard, supra note 32.
110. See Aliya Sternstein, FBI Allays Some Critics with First Use of New
Mass-Hacking Warrant, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 24, 2017, 2:44 PM),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/04/fbi-allays-some-critics-with-first-useof-new-mass-hacking-warrant/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2020) (describing the Kelihos
takedown) [perma.cc/N6GW-3CN6].
111. See id. (describing the Kelihos takedown).
112. See id. (describing the Kelihos takedown).
113. See Affidavit in Support of an Application Under Rule 41 for a Search
Warrant at 2, No. 3:18-MJ-0024-DMS (D. Alaska Apr. 5, 2017) (explaining the
government’s method to take down Kelihos).
114. See id. (explaining the government’s method to take down Kelihos); see
also Sternstein, supra note 110 (same).
115. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 756 (noting that government takedown
efforts “intrude on private computers,” and thus “raise[] legal and ethical
concerns”).
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2018) (prohibiting individuals from
“accessing a computer without authorization” in order to gain information from
the computer’s user); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)–(C) (2018) (establishing criminal
liability for individuals who “intentionally access a protected computer without
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statute that criminalizes intentional, unauthorized access to
computers and networks.117
However, the CFAA does not apply to law enforcement
agencies.118 Instead, the privacy concerns implicated by
government takedown efforts should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment.119 The Fourth Amendment provides that
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.120

Often, the Fourth Amendment is contemplated through the
prism of the suppression of evidence in criminal cases.121 But the
protections of the Fourth Amendment are not cabined to protecting
individuals from having evidence used against them in courts.122
Indeed, the “wrong condemned by the Amendment is ‘fully
authorization” when that access causes damage or loss); see also Zeitlin, supra
note 18, at 756–57 (explaining the CFAA’s protections, which limit private uses
of sinkholing).
117. See Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Is the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act?, WIRED (Nov. 28, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/hackerlexicon-computer-fraud-abuse-act/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (describing the
CFAA as “a federal anti-hacking statute that prohibits unauthorized access to
computers and networks”) [perma.cc/HY2E-7GFD].
118. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(f) (2018) (“This section does not prohibit any
lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law
enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a
State, or of an intelligence agency of the United States.”).
119. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .”); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921)
(specifying that the Fourth Amendment’s “protection applies to governmental
action”).
120. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
121. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Post-Riley Search Warrant, 69 VAND. L.
REV. 585, 590 (2016) (“In standard Fourth Amendment caselaw, the question of
whether a search warrant is properly executed is litigated after the search is
conducted.”).
122. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (protecting “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)
(explaining that the Fourth Amendment is not merely a tool for suppressing
evidence).
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accomplished’ by the unlawful [invasion] itself.”123 By suppressing
the ill-begotten evidence, a court cannot “cure the invasion of the
defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.”124 Instead,
suppression merely serves to deter law enforcement from future
Fourth Amendment violations.125
Botnet takedowns offend the Fourth Amendment rights of the
owners of infected devices. These owners are not suspects in the
botnet investigation and will not face prosecution. Thus, any
evidence procured from the Fourth Amendment violations would
not be used against them in court.
At first glance, it may seem that an analysis of the Fourth
Amendment implications of botnet takedowns is only an academic
exercise. If the invasion does not result in evidence that could be
used against the owner, maybe the invasion does not matter.
Furthermore, owners generally have an interest in eradicating the
infection because it may slow down their device or compromise
their data.126 Perhaps it seems harsh to limit law enforcement’s
ability to help owners by asserting the owners’ Fourth Amendment
rights.
But to turn a blind eye to such intrusions would sanction
government overreach.
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent. Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding.127

123. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)).
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. See id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348) (noting that the exclusionary
rule “operates as a ‘judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved’”).
126. See Jonathan Strickland, How to Fix Your Zombie Computer, HOW STUFF
WORKS,
https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/how-to-tech/how-to-fix-zombiecomputer1.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (explaining that botnets can slow down
an infected computer) [perma.cc/W2XD-CYU2].
127. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 477 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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V. Search: The Collection of IP Addresses
A. “The Technology We Exalt Today Is Everyman’s Master”

For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, government conduct
is a search if it meets the criteria of either the Katz128 “reasonable
expectation of privacy” analysis or the trespass test.129 Courts have
not had occasion to consider the government’s collection of IP
addresses in the context of botnet takedowns. But courts have
considered this question in another context: The government’s use
of Network Investigative Techniques (NIT).130
In the most prominent examples of these cases, the Playpen
cases, the government embedded malware into a child porn site.131
When a user visited the site, the malware would infect her
computer and report her IP address to the government.132 In many
of the Playpen cases, courts determined that no search had
occurred.133 It is easy enough to accept those Playpen decisions
because the defendants are unsympathetic as “victims” of a search.
“But every person is the victim, for the technology we exalt today
is everyman’s master.”134
128. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that “the
‘trespass doctrine’ can no longer be regarded as controlling”).
129. See Florida v. Jardines, 596 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (explaining that the Katz
definition of search “add[s] to the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the
Amendment’s protections ‘when the government does engage in a physical
intrusion of a constitutionally protected area’” (quoting United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983))); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07, 409
(2012) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176
(1969) (explaining that the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy test has been
added to, not substituted for the common-law trespassory test”).
130. See Kaleigh E. Aucoin, Note, The Spider’s Parlor: Government Malware
on the Dark Web, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1449–50 (2018) (discussing motions to
suppress evidence gathered through NIT).
131. See id. at 1449 (explaining the FBI’s tactics in Playpen and stating that,
although the FBI had employed similar tactics before, the Playpen cases were
particularly controversial “because a single warrant led to an estimated collection
of IP addresses ranging somewhere in the thousands”).
132. See id. at 1446 (explaining how malware infects a device).
133. See id. at 1442, 1450–51 (explaining how the government uses NIT and
stating that the government “deploy[ed] a NIT to any person’s computer who
logged into Playpen regardless of where they logged in from”).
134. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 757 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
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Online companies use IP addresses to “know exactly what
devices (and users) are utilizing their services.”135 An IP address is
more than simply the address where you receive an email.136 It can
be used to track your very movements.137 In the future, in the
interconnected world, almost all tangible items will have an IP
address.138 Not only cars and phones will be traceable, but
children, dogs, books (if they still exist), food, almost everything
will have an IP address.139 To allow the government to have
unfettered access to our every movement is unfathomable. Those
judicial decisions that fail to recognize the centrality of the IP
address to our every movement are relics of a pre-interconnected
world.
This Note argues that, in cases of botnet takedowns, the
government’s collection of IP addresses is a search under both the
Katz test and the trespass test. To demonstrate the inevitable
dangers of a different conclusion, this section will trace Supreme
Court jurisprudence as it pertains to technology.
B. Katz: A Beacon of Hope?
The rise of technology has exacerbated the already difficult
question of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. In the
first era of search law, courts held that there could be no Fourth
Amendment search without a physical intrusion of a
constitutionally protected area.140 In 1967, faced with a case of
dissenting).
135. GOODMAN, supra note 46, at 66.
136. See id. at 54 (explaining that IP addresses are “exploited to give internet
companies and their advertisers a clear and persistent look at you and your online
activities”).
137. See id. at 209 (explaining how IP addresses aid in the surveillance of
online activities).
138. Id. at 287; see What Is an IP Address?, AVAST ACAD.,
https://www.avast.com/c-what-is-an-ip-address (last updated Feb. 6, 2020) (last
visited Oct. 16, 2020) (“Every single device that is connected to the internet has
an IP address.”) [perma.cc/7DH3-U2Z6].
139. See GOODMAN, supra note 46, at 287 (“We can think of today’s internet
as the size of a golf ball. Tomorrow’s will be the size of the sun.”).
140. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATING CRIME 95 (6th ed. 2017) (explaining that early search law used a
property-based approach).
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electronic eavesdropping, the Supreme Court kicked off a new era
of search law.141
In Katz, government agents installed an electronic listening
device to the outside of a telephone booth that the defendant used
to place his calls.142 The government asserted that no search had
occurred because the phone booth was not a constitutionally
protected area and agents had not physically penetrated the phone
booth.143
Eschewing a strict adherence to the trespass doctrine, the
Court instead focused on privacy.144 The Court declined to decide
whether or not the phonebooth was constitutionally protected,
noting that
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.145

Turning next to the issue of physical intrusion, the Court
determined that “the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure.”146
The Court held that a Fourth Amendment search had
occurred, and in his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articulated
a two-prong test that has since “become the primary standard for
determining whether police conduct constitutes a search:”147
“[F]irst, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”148

141. See id. at 96 (noting that the “second period of ‘search’ law” began with
Katz).
142. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (providing the facts
of the case).
143. See id. at 351–54 (noting the government’s arguments).
144. See id. at 351 (noting that the government can violate an individual’s
Fourth Amendment right to privacy without committing a physical trespass).
145. Id. at 351.
146. Id. at 353.
147. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 140, at 102.
148. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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The new approach was attractive in part because of its
flexibility, which alleviated concerns about how the government
could use technology to circumvent the stringent requirements of
the trespass doctrine.149 For example, in Kyllo v. United States,150
a government agent used a thermal-imaging device to establish
that the defendant was using heat lamps to grow marijuana in his
home.151 It has long been accepted that the Fourth Amendment’s
protections of the home are especially powerful.152 Nonetheless,
this egregious invasion slips through the cracks of the trespass
doctrine.
Though the device was aimed at a constitutionally protected
area (a private home), there was no physical intrusion.153 The
agent operated the device from a public street,154 and the device
picked up heat emanating from the outer surface of the house.155
Noting that “in the case of the interior of homes . . . there is ready
criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal
149. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971)
Until Katz v. United States, neither wiretapping nor electronic
eavesdropping violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
‘unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or
such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an
actual physical invasion of his house or curtilage for the purpose of
making a seizure.
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1942)).
150. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 41 (2001) (holding that
“[w]here . . . the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant”).
151. See id. at 29 (providing the facts of Kyllo).
152. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (“[A]t the very core
[of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” (quoting Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))); Florida v. Jardines, 596 U.S. 1, 5
(2013) (“When it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among
equals.”).
153. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 (noting that “a thermal imager captures only
heat emanating from a house”).
154. See id. at 30 (“The scan of Kyllo’s home . . . was performed from the
passenger seat of Agent Elliott's vehicle across the street from the front of the
house and also from the street in back of the house.”).
155. See id. (noting that the device could not penetrate the surface of the
house).
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expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be
reasonable,”156 the Court held that the Katz reasonableness test is
automatically satisfied if the government uses technology that is
not widely available to the public in order to obtain information
about the interior of the home.157
When viewed in light of the Kyllo holding, it seems as though
the government has performed a search if it retrieves information
from an individual’s infected device. The precise language does
cabin the rule to investigations aimed at private homes. But the
government cannot ensure that a sinkhole will only capture public
IP addresses.158 The sinkhole will capture the addresses of any
computer infected with the malware.159 That could be a device
located in a public area, but it could also be a home computer, a
home’s smart refrigerator, or a home’s Echo device—anything that
contains the botnet’s malware.160
Furthermore, the Court has indicated that, because of the
amount of information stored on cell phones and computers,
privacy expectations on those devices are tantamount to those of a
home.161 Thus, it is reasonable to assume the Kyllo holding would
extend to an individual’s laptop or cellphone even if, at the time of

156. Id.
157. See id. at 34 (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have
been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’
constitutes a search—at least where . . . the technology in question is not in
general public use.”).
158. See Rouse, supra note 100 (explaining how a sinkhole works).
159. See Markus Rauschecker, Symposium Essays from the State of Cyberlaw:
Security and Privacy in the Digital Age: Rule 41 Amendments Provide for a
Drastic Expansion of Government Authority to Conduct Computer Searches and
Should Not Have Been Adopted by the Supreme Court, 76 MD. L. REV. 1085, 1085
(2017) (explaining that, “if a target location of a computer is unknown,” the
government cannot know where the search will occur).
160. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text (defining sinkholing and
explaining how it can be used to take down a botnet).
161. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396–97 (2014)
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far
more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only
contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the
home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found
in a home in any form—unless the phone is.
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the government’s hack back,162 the individual had carried that
device into a public area.
But, when it comes to technology, the Katz application is not
as privacy-friendly as it seems. “[U]nsurprisingly, those ‘actual
(subjective) expectations of privacy’ ‘that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable,’’ bear an uncanny resemblance to those
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.”163 In
application, Katz birthed two doctrines that have not aged well in
modern times.164
1. The Third-Party Doctrine
Under the third-party doctrine, “a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information that he voluntarily turns over
to third parties.”165 Federal courts have frequently invoked the
third-party doctrine to hold that an IP address does not meet the
Katz test.166 This section argues that the notion that an IP address
is not subject to search because it falls under the third-party
doctrine is dated, not only according to recent caselaw, but by
technological advances.
The rationale behind the third-party doctrine is that, by
conveying information to a third party, an individual assumes the
risk that the third party will convey that information to the
government.167 This rationale takes on a particularly sinister vibe
162. Hacking back is a term that some cyber-savvy individuals use to describe
retaliation efforts against hackers, such as those described in Section II.
163. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
164. See discussion infra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2 (discussing the third-party
doctrine and the binary search doctrine).
165. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (citations omitted).
166. See United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Federal
courts have uniformly held that ‘subscriber information provided to an internet
provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation’
because it is voluntarily conveyed to third parties.” (quoting United States v.
Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008))). But see United States v. Hachey,
Criminal No. 16-0128, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34192, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7,
2017) (refusing to apply the third-party doctrine to the government’s collection of
IP addresses).
167. See Elspeth A. Brotherton, Comment, Big Brother Gets a Makeover:
Behavioral Targeting and the Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 574–75
(2012) (explaining the assumption of risk rationale behind the third-party
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when considered in light of ever-advancing technology.168 In early
cases, the Court was generally apathetic to these concerns.
The roots of the third-party doctrine come from a line of “false
friend” cases.169 False friend cases can be divided into two
categories: “[P]ure false friend” and “wired false friend.”170 In a
pure false friend case, the defendant privately makes statements
to an individual who turns out to be a government informant.171
The false friend then relays that information to the government.172
In a wired false friend case, the informant wears a device that
records or electronically transmits the information to law
enforcement.173 Before Katz, the Court routinely found no Fourth
Amendment violation regardless of whether the false friend was
wired.174 Under the pre-Katz, property-based approach to search
law, it makes sense not to distinguish between wired and pure.175
But the Court also articulated an additional rationale:
Assumption of risk.176
In United States v. White,177 a post-Katz wired false-friend
case, a plurality of the Court seized upon that assumption of risk
rationale and merged it into the objective prong of Katz: An
doctrine).
168. See id. at 577 (“Legal commentators generally disagree with the
soundness of the doctrine, criticizing the Court's understanding of what
constitutes ‘reasonable’ expectations of privacy as out of touch with reality.”).
169. See id. at 574–75 (discussing the evolution of the third-party doctrine).
170. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, VOL. 1: INVESTIGATION 81–82 (6th ed. 2016) (describing the two
categories of false friend cases).
171. See id. at 82 (providing a basic “pure false friend” fact pattern).
172. See id. (providing a basic “pure false friend” fact pattern).
173. See id. (providing a basic “wired false friend” fact pattern).
174. See id. at 84 (“Prior to Katz, the fact that a false friend was ‘wired’ with
a transmitter or tape recorder was irrelevant to ‘search’ analysis.”).
175. See id. (“As long as the agent did not trespass, no search occurred.”).
176. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding that the
defendant could not invoke the Fourth Amendment to prevent his false friend
from testifying against him and noting that the Fourth Amendment does not
“protect[] a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it”); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
438 (1963) (holding that the defendant’s statements, which had been tape
recorded by a false friend, were not the product of a search and noting that the
defendant “knew full well” that those statements “could be used against him”).
177. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971) (holding that Katz did
not disturb the Court’s previous false friend decisions).
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individual cannot have a legitimate, constitutionally protected
expectation that a person he speaks to will not reveal the
conversation to the police.178 According to the White Court, there is
no constitutional difference between a pure false friend and a
wired false friend.179 Harlan, the author of the Katz test, wrote a
fiery dissent.180 Harlan agreed that Katz left pure false friend cases
undisturbed, but, citing Orwellian concerns, he urged that wired
false friend cases should be overturned.181
In United States v. Miller,182 the seminal third-party case,183
the Court extended the assumption of risk rationale to apply to
information conveyed to a third-party entity.184 Upholding the
warrantless search of a defendant’s banking records, the Court
178. See id. at 751
If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic
equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally justifiable
expectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the
same conversations made by the agent or by others from transmissions
received from the agent to whom the defendant is talking and whose
trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks.
179. The Court explains that the Fourth Amendment does not require the
suppression of evidence in pure false friend cases and states that
For constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the
agent . . . either (1) simultaneously records them with electronic
equipment which he is carrying on his person (2) or carries radio
equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations either to
recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring
the transmitting frequency.
Id. at 751.
180. See id. at 769–95 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (urging that Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence had moved away from the rationale of previous wired
false friend cases).
181. See id. at 777 (“[I]t is one thing to subject the average citizen to the risk
that participants in a conversation with him will subsequently divulge its
contents to another, but quite a different matter to foist upon him the risk that
unknown third parties may be simultaneously listening in.”).
182. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that
it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in
the third party will not be betrayed.
183. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (“The
third-party doctrine largely traces its roots to Miller.”).
184. See Brotherton, supra note 168, at 574–75 (tracing Miller’s assumption
of risk rationale to the false friend cases).
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stated that “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to
the Government.”185
In Smith v. Maryland,186 the Court extended the rationale
even further. In that case, the government asked a phone company
to install a pen register in order to record the numbers that the
defendant dialed from his home telephone.187 The Court
determined that the defendant’s privacy interest in outgoing phone
numbers did not meet the objective prong of Katz.188 To reach this
holding, the Court reasoned that “all telephone users realize that
they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company,” and
thus those numbers are covered by the third-party doctrine.189
According to the Court, the fact that the information was conveyed
to a switchboard, rather than a telephone operator, was
immaterial to a third-party doctrine analysis.190
Although Miller and Smith ostensibly rely on an assumption
of risk rationale, those cases’ broad conception of “voluntariness”
seem to undermine that rationale’s logic.191 Can an individual
really be charged with volunteering to provide information if
providing such information is nearly a requirement of modern
life?192 This broad conception of the third-party doctrine is “ill
suited for the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks.”193
185. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
186. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding that the defendant
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers he dialed
because he “voluntarily conveyed that information to the telephone company”).
187. See id. at 737 (providing the facts of the case).
188. See id. at 744 (“[E]ven if petitioner did harbor some subjective
expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this
expectation is not ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S., at 361)).
189. Id. at 742.
190. See id. at 745 (“We are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional
result is required because the telephone company has decided to automate.”).
191. See id. at 750 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“It is idle to speak of ‘assuming’
risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic
alternative.”).
192. See id. at 749 (“Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some
notion of choice.”).
193. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
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In Carpenter v. United States,194 the Court narrowed the scope
of the third-party doctrine. In that case, the government obtained
cell-site tracking information from the defendant’s wireless
carriers.195 Rejecting the government’s argument that the
information was covered by the third-party doctrine, the Court
articulated two rationales behind the doctrine and determined that
neither rationale was satisfied.196
First, the Court stated that “[t]he third-party doctrine partly
stems from the notion that an individual has a reduced expectation
of privacy in information knowingly shared with another.”197 The
Court stated that this rationale required an inspection of the
nature of the information.198 This notion, that there is a qualitative
consideration embedded in the third-party doctrine, was not a
proper application of Miller and Smith.199 Although those cases
indeed noted the quality of the information procured, “the fact that
information was relinquished to a third party was the entire basis
for concluding that the defendants in those cases lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy.”200 Nonetheless, the Carpenter
Court focused on the accuracy and detail of cell site location
information, noting that “when Smith was decided in 1979, few
could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its
owner goes, conveying to the wireless carrier not just dialed digits,
but a detailed and comprehensive record of the person’s
movements.”201
Next, the Court turned to the notion of “voluntary exposure”
(i.e. assumption of risk).202 The Court noted that the use of a cell
concurring).
194. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (holding
that cell site location information is not covered by the third-party doctrine).
195. See id. at 2211 (providing the facts of the case).
196. See id. at 2210 (explaining the rationales behind the third-party
doctrine).
197. Id.
198. See id. (emphasizing that the opinions in Smith and Miller took note of
the nature of the information).
199. See id. at 2231 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
opinion misinterprets Miller and Smith).
200. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2232 (2018) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
201. Id. at 2217.
202. Id.; see also Brotherton, supra note 202 at 577–78 (discussing the
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phone is “indispensable to participation in modern society.”203
Further noting that the data was recorded “without any
affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up,” the
Court determined that the cell phone user had not meaningfully
“assum[ed] the risk” of disclosing the data.204
Applying Miller and Smith would seem to indicate that, like
the banking records and pen register information at issue in those
cases, an IP address would not be the type of information that
would require a warrant. By merely having an IP address, an
individual has voluntarily turned her IP address over to her ISP,
thus waiving her right to privacy of that information.
In a post-Carpenter world, however, the analysis is less clear.
By focusing on the necessity of cell phones, the Carpenter opinion
ostensibly revitalizes a true voluntariness requirement.205
However, the opinion does not overturn Miller, and as the dissent
points out, carrying a cell phone is no more of a necessity than
having a bank account.206 Thus, it is possible that the Court’s
primary concern was the sheer amount of information contained in
the cell site data. Regardless, Carpenter illustrates that the Court
is prepared to alter doctrine, and perhaps even abandon it, to stay
current with the times, or at least to appear to do so.207
An IP address, like a cell phone, is a necessity of life in the
modern world.208 Thus, under a Carpenter analysis, the
voluntariness requirement is not met.209 Furthermore, although IP
relationship between “volunteered” information and assumption of risk).
203. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (2018).
204. Id.
205. Id. (noting that cell phones are a necessity of modern life and refusing to
hold that cell site location information, though held by a third party, is subject to
the third-party doctrine).
206. See id. at 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that using a bank
account is “no more or less necessary than the decision whether to use a cell
phone”).
207. See id. at 2220 (limiting the third-party doctrine by excluding cell site
location information).
208. See GOODMAN, supra note 138 (discussing the operation and ubiquity of
IP addresses).
209. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (2018) (noting that the third-party
doctrine covers information that is voluntarily shared); see also Brotherton, supra
note 202, at 577–78 (discussing the relationship between “volunteered”
information and the third-party doctrine).
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addresses are currently not as revealing as cell site locations,
predictions about the interconnectedness of the future digital
universe indicate that IP addresses would be more ubiquitous than
cell phones—and provide abundant information about almost
everything.210 The new IP allows for so many internet connections
“that within the coming years, not only will every computer, phone,
and tablet be online, but so too will every car, house, dog, bridge,
tunnel, cup, clock, pacemaker, cow, streetlight, pipeline, toy, and
soda can.”211 Everything and everybody will be connected.212 In
that world the Justices will very likely blanche at the notion of the
government possessing such information.
2. The Binary Search Doctrine
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that society is
not willing to legitimize an individual’s privacy interest in
contraband.213 And thus, under the binary search doctrine,
“government conduct that only reveals the possession of
contraband” is not a search because it does not compromise an
expectation of “privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable.”214
When a botnet takedown reports a victim’s IP address to the
government, it tells the government only that that computer is
infected with illegal malware.215 Thus, it might seem alluring to
slap the binary search doctrine onto the conduct and call it a day.
But extending the binary search doctrine to “obtain identifying
information” turns the doctrine on its head.216
210. See GOODMAN, supra note 46, at 288 (discussing the future
interconnectedness of the Internet of Things).
211. Id. at 287.
212. See id. (noting that, in the future, virtually everything will be connected
to the internet and capable of sharing information).
213. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (“We have held that any
interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate . . . .”); see also
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (“A chemical test that merely
discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise
any legitimate interest in privacy.”).
214. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–09 (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122, 123).
215. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 752 (describing the processes involved in a
botnet takedown).
216. See Meyer, supra note 47, at 608 (“Government hacking to obtain
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To illustrate, consider a dog sniffing luggage in an airport, the
archetypal application of the binary search doctrine.217 The dog
alerts to a particular individual’s luggage, letting the officer know
that the individual has drugs in her bag.218 Under the binary
search doctrine, the individual has not been searched.219
Now, consider another example. A police officer, sitting at the
police station, suspects that there are people in America walking
down the street with marijuana in their pockets. Luckily for him,
the police officer has a piece of technology which allows him to
press a button and learn the location of every individual who is
carrying marijuana. Does the binary search doctrine still apply?
The latter hypothetical seems absurd, but it demonstrates the
dangers of contorting the binary search doctrine to cover the
government’s collection of IP addresses in botnet takedowns. What
if the government could press a button and learn the IP address of
every computer in America that contains illegally downloaded
music files?220 That is a very real possibility.221
To comport with the established application of the binary
search doctrine, as demonstrated in the first hypothetical, the
government would need to know a potential botnet victim’s
individual IP address, then use technology which simply reported
back whether or not that individual’s device was indeed infected.222
In other words, a binary search can only answer one question: Yes
or No? It should not be extended to cover: No or Yes—and here is
where to find them.223
identifying information . . . does not implicate the Fourth Amendment's exception
for contraband. There is nothing inherently unlawful about an IP address.”).
217. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 687–68 (1983).
218. Id.
219. See id. at 707 (concluding that exposing someone’s luggage to a drug
sniffing dog does not constitute a search).
220. See Meyer, supra note 47, at 613–14 (“Are we prepared for a society in
which, at the press of a button, the government could constitutionally hack and
identify millions of Americans who have committed mundane misdemeanors?”).
221. See id. at 614 (“This is no thought experiment: [T]he technology is
straightforward and exists today.”).
222. See id. at 608 (“Government hacking to obtain identifying
information . . . does not implicate the Fourth Amendment’s exception for
contraband. There is nothing inherently unlawful about an IP address.”).
223. See id. (explaining that the binary search doctrine applies only to
“technique[s] that solely indicate[] the presence or absence of contraband”).
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C. It’s Alive!: The Resurrection of the Trespass Doctrine
For a time, the Katz analysis seemed to have replaced the
trespass doctrine entirely.224 Fact patterns that satisfy the
trespass test usually also satisfy the Katz analysis.225 Take the
paradigmatic trespassory search, in which a police officer breaks
into a home looking for evidence: Such conduct would of course
meet the trespass test, but it would also readily meet the Katz
expectation of privacy analysis.226 Thus, at first glance, it seems
that Katz would cover any circumstance that the trespass doctrine
would have covered and then some. But the binary search and
third-party doctrine create opportunities for the government to use
technology to collect information without meeting the Katz
analysis.
Worry not. In 2012, forty-five years after Katz, the Supreme
Court made an important clarification: Katz is a supplement to,
and not a replacement of, the trespass doctrine.227 This revelation
comes courtesy of another electronic surveillance case, Jones v.
United States.228
In Jones, the government put a tracking device on the
defendant’s car and monitored his movements for weeks.229 The
government arguably had precedent on its side. In two “beeper

224. See DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 140, at 160 (describing Jones as “the
return of the trespass doctrine to the ‘search’ analysis”).
225. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407–08 (2012)
We have embodied [the] preservation of past [property] rights in our
very definition of ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ which we have
said to be an expectation that has a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted
by society.
226. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 771 (explaining that the trespass doctrine
and the Katz analysis are often overlapping).
227. Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07, 409.
228. See id. at 404 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS
device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”).
229. See id. at 403 (providing the facts of the case).
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cases,” Knotts230 and Karo,231 the Court determined that no search
had occurred when the government used an electronic beeper to
track a defendant’s movements on public roads.232 In Knotts, the
government implanted a beeper into a can that would be purchased
by the defendant.233 In Karo, the government agents “substituted
their own can containing a beeper for one of the cans” that was to
be shipped to the defendant.234 Citing the “beeper cases,” the
government attempted to rely on the third-party doctrine, arguing
that “Jones had no ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in the area
of the Jeep accessed by Government agents (its underbody) and the
locations of the Jeep on public roads, which were visible to all.”235
Insisting that “Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall
with the Katz formulation,” the Court declined to address the
government’s Katz expectation of privacy argument.236 Instead, the
Court announced that “Katz did not narrow the Fourth
Amendment’s scope” and the trespass doctrine was alive and
well.237 The Court pointed out that there was one important
distinction between Jones and the prior beeper cases: In Jones, the
government trespassed.238 In both Knotts and Karo, the
government installed the beepers into the cans before they came
into the defendants’ possession.239 On the other hand, the
defendant in Jones owned his car at the time of the installation.240
230. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (holding that “a
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfare has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements”).
231. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (holding that the
information gained from the beeper when it was within the defendant’s private
residence was a search but that the evidence gained when he was on public streets
was not a search).
232. See Knotts, 460 U.S at 281 (stating that the defendant did not have an
“expectation of privacy” for his movements on public roads); see also Karo, 468
U.S. at 714 (noting that an individual cannot expect for his public actions to be
private).
233. See Knotts, 460 U.S at 277 (providing the facts of the case).
234. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 708 (providing the facts of the case).
235. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 408.
238. See id. at 408–10 (distinguishing Jones from Knotts and Karo).
239. See id. (distinguishing Jones from Knotts and Karo).
240. See id. (noting that Jones “is on much different footing” than Knotts and
Karo because Jones owned the car “at the time the Government trespassorily
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In Florida v. Jardines,241 the Supreme Court considered
whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred when police
officers brought a drug-sniffing dog onto the defendant’s porch.242
The dog alerted to the smell of drugs, and police used the
information obtained from the dog to get a warrant to search the
defendant’s home.243
The only information sought through the use of the
drug-sniffing dog was whether or not the defendant had illegal
narcotics in his home.244 Thus, the Court could arguably have
applied the binary search doctrine and determined that no Fourth
Amendment search had occurred. Instead, lauding the trespass
doctrine for “keep[ing] easy cases easy,” the Court stated that the
fact that “the officers learned what they learned only by physically
intruding on [the defendant’s] property to gather evidence is
enough to establish that a search occurred.”245
Jones and Jardines clarify that when the government
physically intrudes on a constitutionally protected area for the
purpose of gaining information, a Fourth Amendment search has
occurred, regardless of whether or not the information sought is
“private.”246 Thus, even if an IP address is not “private” under a
Katz analysis, the process the government uses to gather that
information might be a search under the trespass test.
Obviously, the information-gathering requirement is satisfied
by the collection of IP addresses. Furthermore, the infected devices
are likely to be in homes or other constitutionally protected
areas.247 And, even if the device is not in a constitutionally
inserted the information-gathering device”).
241. See Florida v. Jardines, 596 U.S. 1, 7 (2013) (determining that a Fourth
Amendment search had occurred because the government had conducted an
investigation in a constitutionally protected area and the investigation was
“accomplished by an unlicensed physical intrusion”).
242. Id. at 3–4.
243. Id. at 4.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 11.
246. See id. at 5, 9 (Brennan, J., concurring) (outlining the trespass test (citing
Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07 n.3; United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983))).
247. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (“A cell
phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private
residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing
locales.”).
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protected area, the device itself is likely to be a cell phone or
computer, and the Court has indicated that the constitutional
protections extended to cell phones and computers are tantamount
to the protections afforded to the home.248
The sticking point in a trespass-based analysis of a botnet
takedown is whether or not there has been a physical intrusion.249
The question of whether the government’s use of malware to learn
an IP address constitutes a search has generally been considered
in NIT cases, where the government planted the malware in the
computer in the first place.250 In such cases, courts have been
inconsistent in their trespass analysis, highlighting the difficulties
of applying the trespass doctrine in the digital world.251 But the
best answer is that implanting malware is a physical intrusion,
albeit a tiny one.252
In one NIT case, the judge noted that malware itself is
computer code, which “ultimately consists of flipped bits on
magnetic storage.”253 The judge concluded that a physical intrusion
had occurred.254 But the judge implicitly acknowledged that the
trespass doctrine may be a poor fit for a “computerized search” and
bolstered his decision that the government had conducted a search

248. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396–97 (2014)
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government
far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only
contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the
home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found
in a home in any form—unless the phone is.
249. See United States v. Hachey, Criminal No. 16-0128, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34192, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017) (determining that the government’s
hack back constituted a physical trespass but also noting that some may question
that determination).
250. See Aucoin, supra note 130, at 1449–50 (discussing the government’s use
of NIT technology as it pertains to the Fourth Amendment).
251. See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir.
2010) (determining that the government’s use of NIT did not constitute search).
But see Hachey, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34192, at *20 (determining that the use of
NIT software was a physical intrusion).
252. See Hachey, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34192, at *18 (holding that “computer
code . . . did indeed physically occupy Defendant’s computer in his home”).
253. Id.
254. Id.
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by discussing non-trespass Supreme Court cases “where high-tech
methods were at issue.”255
Unlike NIT cases, when the government sinkholes a botnet it
does not implant devices with malware.256 Rather, it takes over the
botnet’s already existing malware, which is distributed throughout
devices all over the world. Does the government physically intrude
by taking over an already implanted physical object?
It is difficult to analogize this conduct to traditional, physical
world applications of the trespass doctrine. In Jones, the
government performed a trespassory search by planting a tracking
device on the defendant’s car.257 In Knotts and Karo, however,
there was no trespass because the tracking devices had already
been implanted in the cans at the time that they came into the
defendants’ possession.258 The government’s takeover of malware
does not fit neatly into either of these fact patterns. Unlike Jones,
when the government takes over malware, the government does
not originate the physical intrusion, it simply changes the
character of that physical intrusion.259 Before the sinkhole, the
botnet reported to a hacker.260 After the sinkhole, the botnet
reports to the government.261
Consider the following alteration of Knotts and Karo: The
government has an interest in tracking person A. The government
learns that person B, a private citizen, has planted a tracking
device on person A’s car. Without person A’s knowledge, the
government electronically takes control of the tracking device. Has
the government trespassed?
255. Id. at *20.
256. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 752–56 (describing the processes involved
in a botnet takedown).
257. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408–10 (2012) (distinguishing
Jones from Knotts and Karo).
258. See id. at 409 (stating that, in Karo and Knotts, “at the time the beeper
was installed the container belonged to a third party, and it did not come into
possession of the defendant until later.”).
259. See Zeitlin, supra note 18, at 752–56 (describing the processes involved
in a botnet takedown).
260. See id. at 748 (explaining that botnets receive commands from
botmasters).
261. See id. at 751–52 (discussing how “[s]inkholing temporarily prevents the
botmaster from controlling infected computers” and gives the government control
instead).
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Answering this question in the negative is, quite simply, bad
for business. Taken to its logical conclusion, such a finding could
be extended to determine that no trespass has occurred if the
government surreptitiously took over a smart speaker, such as an
Alexa-enabled Echo device, in a private home.
One out of every five Americans has a smart speaker in their
home.262 Although these speakers are not always recording, they
are always listening.263 Even though they are not supposed to
record until they hear a wake-up word, “contractors hired by device
makers to review recordings for quality reasons report hearing
clips that were most likely captured unintentionally, including
drug deals and sex.”264 If there is no trespass in such a situation,
the case would be analyzed under Katz, and therefore subjected to
the unwieldy third-party doctrine.265 After Carpenter, it is likely
that the Court would determine that the application of the
third-party doctrine in that case is a bridge too far.266 But it seems
risky to wait to find out.
VI. Rule 41
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals’ privacy by
requiring the government to obtain a warrant from a neutral and
detached magistrate before it can perform a search.267 Under Rule
262. See Kashmir Hill, Activate This “Bracelet of Silence,” and Alexa Can’t
TIMES
(Feb.
14,
2020),
Eavesdrop,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/technology/alexa-jamming-braceletprivacy-armor.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2020) (explaining how ubiquitous smart
speakers are) [perma.cc/8RXJ-G88Z].
263. See id. (“By design, smart speakers have microphones that are always
on, listening for so-called wake words like ‘Alexa,’ ‘Hey, Siri,’ or ‘O.K., Google.’
Only after hearing that cue are they supposed to start recording.”).
264. Id.
265. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07, 409 (2012) (explaining
that the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy test has been added to . . . the
common-law trespassory test”).
266. But cf. United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (suggesting
that Carpenter’s impact on the third-party doctrine is limited to instances where
only a small proportion of society would escape the electronic surveillance in
question).
267. See Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979) (“We have
repeatedly said that a warrant authorized by a neutral and detached judicial
officer is ‘a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried
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41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a magistrate judge
or district court judge can issue a warrant to search property only
within her district.268 The Rule enumerates a couple of
exceptions,269 but, before 2016, none of those exceptions “addressed
the special circumstances that arise when officers execute search
warrants, via remote access, over modern communications such as
the internet.”270
Thus, before 2016, treating the government’s retrieval of IP
addresses from infected computers as a search would have created
the proverbial chicken and the egg dilemma: Law enforcement
needed to know the locations of the infected computers in order to
get a warrant to perform the search, but the identity of infected
computers was unavailable to law enforcement until after the
search had already been performed.271 Adding to law enforcement’s
dilemma, botnets are often sprawled on devices throughout the
country.272
Theoretically, the government could have requested a search
warrant in every district in the United States.273 But, in addition
judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime.’”).
268. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“[A] magistrate judge with authority in the
district—or if none is reasonably available, a judge of a state court of record in
the district—has authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or
property located within the district.”).
269. See Meyer, supra note 47, at 626–27 (“A magistrate can also issue a
warrant for property outside her district, but only in exceptional circumstances.
Until recently, those circumstances were: property currently within the district
that might move outside the district, terrorism investigations, tracking device
installation within the district, and crimes committed on certain federal
property.”).
270. Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to the Hon. Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Crim. Rules, supra note
31.
271. Cf. Meyer, supra note 47, at 621 (describing particularity issues
associated with warrants to search unknown devices and noting that there is “a
seeming chicken-and-egg problem: how can investigators describe, with
particularity, the very electronic device that they are attempting to discover”).
272. See Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to the Hon. Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Crim. Rules,
supra note 31 (“[A] large botnet investigation is likely to require action in all 94
districts, but coordinating 94 simultaneous warrants in the 94 districts would be
impossible as a practical matter.”).
273. Id.
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to being cumbersome for law enforcement,274 that solution is
fraught with legal peril. There are ninety-four districts in the
United States.275 Even if all ninety-four magistrates were served
with nearly identical warrants, it is quite possible that there would
not be a consensus among them.276 In the physical world, allowing
each magistrate judge to make her own determination as to
whether to sign a warrant is a good thing.277 However, because of
the nature of botnet takedowns, allowing for individualized
discretion poses a problem. If ninety-three out of ninety-four
magistrates signed off on the search but one magistrate did not,
the government could not perform the search because there is no
way to make sure that the sinkhole does not retrieve information
from the hold-out magistrate’s district.278
To address these limitations, the Department of Justice
campaigned for an amendment to Rule 41 that would allow
magistrate judges to grant extra-district warrants in cases
involving botnets and other cybercrimes.279 The amendment was
passed in December 2016 and it provides the following:
[A] magistrate judge with authority in any district where
274. See id. (“At a minimum, requiring so many magistrate judges to review
virtually identical probable cause affidavits wastes judicial and investigative
resources and creates delays that may have adverse consequences for the
investigation.”).
275. See Court Role and Structure, About Federal Courts, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure
(last
visited Sept. 27, 2020) (“In the federal court system’s present form, 94 district
level trial courts and 13 courts of appeals sit below the Supreme Court.”)
[perma.cc/8DLR-E3NB].
276. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (“Reasonable
minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit
establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for
warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according ‘great deference’ to a
magistrate’s determination.”).
277. See id. (noting that it is appropriate to give deference to magistrate’s
determinations).
278. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1100 (explaining that, because law
enforcement does not know where the infected devices are, it cannot ensure that
it will only search computers in certain locations).
279. See Memorandum from Jeffrey S. Sutton, Comm. on Rules of Prac. &
Proc, Jud. Conf. of the United States to Scott S. Harris, Clerk of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Summary of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules (Oct. 9, 2015) (on file with the author) (discussing the proposed
amendments).
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activities related to a crime may have occurred has authority to
issue a warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage
media and to seize or copy electronically stored information
located within or outside that district if . . . in an investigation
of a violation of [the CFAA], the media are protected computers
that have been damaged without authorization and are located
in five or more districts.280

Many opponents of Rule 41(b)(6)(B) are particularly enraged
by the notion that it allows the government to invade the privacy
of innocent individuals, who themselves are victims of a botnet.281
Although this argument is perhaps effective on a visceral level, it
has no legal ground to stand on. Under the Fourth Amendment,
the government is allowed to search an innocent person’s property
for evidence of a crime.282
A more legitimate concern is how the amendment came to
fruition. Instead of going through Congress, the Department of
Justice pushed the Rule through the Supreme Court by way of the
Advisory Committee.283 Under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, the
Supreme Court has the authority to make procedural changes to
the federal rules, as long as the changes do not “abridge, enlarge,
or modify any substantive right.”284 Substantive amendments, on
the other hand, must be initiated by Congress.285
Opponents of the Rule 41 amendment urge that Congress
should have “initiated, debated, and enacted” the amendment
because it is “drastic expansion of government authority.”286
Proponents of the change insist that the Rule is simply a “venue”
provision.287
280. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(B).
281. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1096 (“[V]ictims of malware could
find themselves doubly infiltrated: their computers infected with malware and
used to contribute to a botnet, and then government agents given free rein to
remotely access their computers as part of the investigation.”).
282. See id. (admitting that the government is allowed to search innocent
parties’ property for evidence of a crime).
283. See Mordock, supra note 26 (noting that the Justice Department “pushed
[this amendment] through the rules committee”).
284. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018).
285. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1087 (noting that only Congress has
the authority to make substantive changes to the Federal Rules).
286. Id.
287. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) advisory committee’s minutes, at 3, 5 (Mar.
16–17, 2015) (presenting the notes from a discussion about the amendment in
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In addition to the substantive versus procedural debate, some
opponents of the Rule argue that Congress would likely have
produced a “nuanced, detailed set of rules.”288 At the heart of this
contention is the fear that the amendment, as written, is overbroad
and that the government will take advantage of this breadth to
collect data from victims’ computers that is not necessary for the
takedown efforts.289
The Kelihos takedown, described above, assuaged some of
these fears.290 That takedown was the government’s first use of the
new Rule 41 in the context of botnet takedowns.291 Opponents of
the Amendment were relieved that the government’s takedown
method in that case was quite similar to pre-Rule 41 peer-to-peer
takedown methods.292 But reliance on executive self-restraint is
dangerous.293
This Note does not endeavor to address the debate as to
whether the 2016 amendments to Rule 41 were an appropriate
exercise of power under the Rules Enabling Act. This Note does,
however, advocate that the Rule is vague and vulnerable to
potential abuse. But, in the author’s view, codifying a more
detailed set of rules is not the best way to ameliorate these
concerns. Botnets, and the methods used to combat them, are

which proponents of the amendment assert that the change is merely procedural);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) advisory committee’s note to 2016 amendment (insisting
that the change is “not substantive” because it simply “identifies the courts that
may consider the application for a warrant, not the constitutional requirements
for the issuance of a warrant, which must still be met”).
288. Mordock, supra note 26.
289. See Sternstein, supra note 110 (discussing the concerns surrounding the
Rule 41 amendment).
290. See id. (stating that critics were relieved to see that the government had
not exploited the Rule 41 amendments); Sara Sun Beale & Peter Berris, Hacking
the Internet of Things, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 161, 188 (2018) (“Some critics of
the Rule 41 amendments were impressed that the government had been
protective of individual privacy: It collected only the victims’ IP addresses and
‘non-content’ routing and signaling information so Internet Service Providers
could notify the victims.”).
291. See Beale, supra note 290, at 188 (discussing the Kelihos takedown).
292. See id. (noting that the Kelihos takedown was similar to previous
takedowns).
293. See Aucoin, supra note 130, at 1463 (“Executive restraint, while a good
thing, is not enough on its own.”).

KEEPING THE ZOMBIES AT BAY

403

evolving constantly.294 Thus, a more dynamic approach is
appropriate.
A. Constitutional Uncertainty
Right now, the fate of botnet victims’ privacy rights is at the
mercy of “ongoing case law development.”295 But waiting for
caselaw to address constitutional concerns regarding Rule
41(b)(6)(B) is dangerous for two reasons. First, because of the
breadth of botnet takedowns and the “sheer amount of data”
contained in smart devices, one overly invasive search could result
in the exposure of a massive amount of private information.296
Second, courts are unlikely to scrutinize the constitutionality
of warrants obtained under Rule 41(b)(6)(B). The owners of
infected devices will not be prosecuted with evidence procured from
their computers, so the constitutionality of warrants obtained
under Rule 41(b)(6)(B) will not be challenged under motions to
suppress. Thus, a judge would only consider whether a warrant
granted under Rule 41(b)(6)(B) violated a botnet victim’s Fourth
Amendment rights if that victim filed a civil suit.
A civil suit is particularly unlikely because it is quite possible
that a victim whose computer has been subjected to a hack back
will never even know it.297 The Rules require the government to
make “reasonable efforts” to notify victims,298 but it is unclear what
“reasonable efforts” entail.299
294. See supra Section II (briefly explaining botnets).
295. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) advisory committee’s note to 2016 amendment.
296. See Gershowitz, supra note 121, at 590 (“[B]ecause of the sheer amount
of data held on cell phones and the clear overbreadth, particularity, and good faith
exception problems present in post-Riley search warrants, addressing the
execution of the warrant ex post is extremely problematic.”); see also Rauschecker,
supra note 159, at 1091 (“The Rule 41 changes would enable the government to
obtain a single warrant that would permit it to access and search the thousands
or millions of computers involved in a botnet.”).
297. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1098 (discussing the likelihood that
owners of hacked computers will never receive notice of the hack and noting that
“owners of searched computers who do not get notice of a search may never find
out that the search has occurred and will therefore never be able to contest the
search warrant”).
298. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C).
299. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1098–99 (“It is unclear . . . what
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The Department of Justice has suggested that it may ask ISPs
to tell victims that their IP addresses have been recorded by the
government.300 When the government employs a takedown method
that requires action on the part of the owner of the device, the
government has independent incentive, outside of compliance with
Rule 41, to provide such notice. However, the Rule gives the
government freedom to remotely remove or manipulate the
malware.301 Under those circumstances, some have suggested that
it is naïve to imagine that every victim will actually be notified.302
B. The Almighty Magistrate
When the government asks a magistrate judge to sign off on a
warrant under Rule 41(b)(6)(B), it puts an incredible amount of
power in her hands.303 Because of the sheer breadth of the search
and the sensitivity of the information that could potentially be
obtained, one misstep could be devastating.304 Furthermore,
because botnet victims are unlikely to bring suit, it is likely that
missteps will go uncorrected.305
notice attempts would constitute a reasonable effort.”).
300. See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Just., to
Ron
Wyden,
Senator,
U.S.
Senate
(Nov.
18,
2016),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3225184/DOJ-Rule-41-Response.pdf
(discussing how the government will attempt to notify a botnet victim that her
device has been searched) [perma.cc/9D87-ZFUS].
301. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
302. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1098 (“It is unrealistic . . . to expect
every computer owner of an affected botnet to be notified of a government
search.”).
303. See Sternstein, supra note 110 (noting that the Rule 41 Amendment
“empower[s] judges to grant a single warrant for searching or seizing information
on any number of devices, regardless of location”).
304. See Gershowitz, supra note 121, at 590 (“[B]ecause of the sheer amount
of data held on cell phones and the clear overbreadth, particularity, and good faith
exception problems present in post-Riley search warrants, addressing the
execution of the warrant ex post is extremely problematic.”); see also Rauschecker,
supra note 159, at 1091 (“The Rule 41 changes would enable the government to
obtain a single warrant that would permit it to access and search the thousands
or millions of computers involved in a botnet.”).
305. See Rauschecker, supra note 159, at 1099 (explaining that many victims
will be unaware of the search so courts will rarely review the warrant’s
legitimacy).
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Thus, it is particularly important that the magistrate judge
granting the warrant makes the proper decision in the first
place.306 This is no simple task: Botnets are technologically
complex and ever evolving.307 To satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s
“reasonableness” requirement, takedown methods should be as
unintrusive as possible, while still being effective.308 But if
magistrates do not understand the technology, they cannot
evaluate whether the government’s request is reasonable.309 To
resolve this problem, magistrate judges should be required to
attend Continuing Judicial Education programs focused on botnet
technology and takedown methods.310 Such programs would
provide magistrates with the technological framework required to
understand the government’s Rule 41 takedown requests and
determine if those requests are reasonable.311
VII. Conclusion
Rule 41 is indeed potentially dangerous. But the alternatives
to that Rule are no better. Botnets are destructive and cannot be
allowed to run amuck. The government’s efforts to combat botnets
are not only beneficial, but crucial, to private citizens.312 Rule 41
allows the government to undertake those efforts within the
306. See Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power
of Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 10–12 (2011) (discussing the
potential ramifications of an ill-advised digital search).
307. See Aucoin, supra note 130, at 1462 (explaining the complexities of the
technology involved in applications for searches under Rule 41 and noting that
“[a] potential issue here is that those authorized to issue searches . . . do not
necessarily understand the technology that they are authorizing.”).
308. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated . . . .”).
309. See Aucoin, supra note 130, at 1462 (“If judges do not understand the
technology then they cannot understand the government action that they
authorize.”).
310. See id. at 1462–63 (recommending mandatory Continuing Judicial
Education in order to “ensur[e] competency in government hacking and
surveillance technology as it pertains to the authorization of warrants”).
311. See id. (explaining that technological Continuing Judicial Education
requirements would ensure that magistrates have the “necessary foundation” to
evaluate applications under the 2016 amendment to Rule 41).
312. See supra Section II (explaining botnets and the dangers posed by them).
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confines of the Fourth Amendment.313 If Rule 41 did not allow the
government to apply for warrants in order to perform takedowns,
quite frankly, the government would perform those takedowns
anyway.314 And the result would lead to the perversion of the
Fourth Amendment’s mandates.315
This Note demonstrates that potential for perversion by
tracing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as it pertains to
technology. Many federal courts have recently invoked that
jurisprudence to reach the conclusion that the government’s
retrieval of an IP address is not a search.316 Most courts have
reached this conclusion by applying the third-party doctrine,
holding that an individual has no legitimate privacy interest in her
IP address.317 In this digital era, that understanding of the
third-party doctrine is dangerous. Carpenter invites courts to walk
back a bit on the third-party doctrine, before it becomes a black
hole that swallows privacy rights.318 Courts should accept that
invitation.
Having established that the government’s collection of IP
addresses is indeed a search, this Note does not seek to eliminate
the government’s opportunity to perform that search. In fact, the
collection of IP addresses from infected computers is one of the
least intrusive steps the government can take in order to
effectively combat botnets. That method ensures that the victim
313. See supra Section VI. Rule 41 (explaining how the amendment to Rule 41
allows a magistrate to issue a warrant for devices outside her district).
314. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (showing that, before Rule 41
was passed, the government obtained civil court orders, rather than search
warrants, to combat botnets); see, e.g., supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text
(noting that, in the Coreflood case, the district court judge determined that the
government’s proposed action did not implicate the Fourth Amendment).
315. See supra Section V. Search: The Collection of IP Addresses (explaining that,
to preserve the integrity of the Fourth Amendment, a botnet takedown must be
considered a search).
316. See United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting
that federal courts have generally held that an individual does not have a Fourth
Amendment right to privacy of her IP address).
317. See id. (“Federal courts have uniformly held that ‘subscriber information
provided to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment’s
privacy expectation’ because it is voluntarily conveyed to third parties.”
(quoting United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008))).
318. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (holding
that cell site location information is not covered by the third-party doctrine).
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will receive notice of the search and minimizes the government’s
need to muck around on her computer.319
Instead, the government should be able to collect IP addresses
if it has a valid warrant. Thus, in the age of botnets, the
amendment to Rule 41 is essential to ensure the proper balance of
national safety and individual privacy. This Note concedes that the
wording of the Rule is broad but argues that specific, detailed
mandates are not a realistic solution because technology is rapidly
advancing. In the context of botnet takedowns, it is dangerous and
unrealistic to await caselaw that would reign in potential
government oversteps.
Continuing Judicial Education for magistrates is the best way
to ensure that the government does not exploit its Rule 41
powers.320 There should be mandatory programs that provide
magistrates with sufficient knowledge to understand the
technology behind botnets and botnet takedowns. Armed with that
basis of knowledge, magistrates can do their job: Provide a barrier
between individual privacy and potentially overzealous policing.

319. See supra Section IV (explaining the collection of IP addresses).
320. See Aucoin, supra note 130, at 1462–63 (recommending mandatory
Continuing Judicial Education in order to “ensur[e] competency in government
hacking and surveillance technology as it pertains to the authorization of
warrants”).

